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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the journey from Basel I to Basel II. It examines the 
historical developments and the circumstances that led to the formulation of the famous 
Basel-I Accord in 1988, and its further refinement over the next two decades culminating 
in the finalization of a comprehensive document viz., the Basel-II Accord. The objective 
of the paper is to provide an insite into the long drawn and painstaking consultative 
process conducted under the aegis of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to 
address some of the long-standing weaknesses inherent in the original Basel Capital  
Adequacy Accord. The paper examines the process of development of the Basel Accord 
from a simple and crude credit risk measurement based capital adequacy accord into a 
comprehensive risk control framework grounded on three pillars: one, the Capital 
Adequncy Pillar which aims to improve the link between Bank Capital and the risks that 
could lead to Bank Insolvency; two, the Supervisory Pillar which aims to improve the 
Supervision Capacity of the regulators / supervisors to control the risk of bank failure; 
and three, the Transparancy Pillar which is aimed at enhancing the capacity of the 
market’s Self Regulatory Mechanism. The paper acknowledges that by responding 
positively to some of the criticisms leveled at it during the various rounds of 
consultations the Committee has accommodated different points of views in the revised 
framework which has made it a more comprehensive and a more widely acceptable 
document for the bank supervisors around the world. The paper is expected to help 
facilitate a better understanding of the process of resulatory development. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Basel-I framework for capital adequacy, introduced in 1988, was designed to 
establish minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks. The framework was 
crude and deeply problematical. It was aimed at setting standards based on ‘rules of the 
thumb’ for example, it relied on a relatively crude method of assigning risk weights to 
balance sheet and off balance sheet asset categories; furthermore it focussed only on 
credit risks while ignoring the bulk of the multiple risks facing banks today. However, its 
simplicity  combined with the political and economic power of the OECD Central Banks  
encouraged over 100 countries across the world not only to adopt the Basel-I framework 
but also to apply it across the entire banking sector without restricting it to the 
internationally active banks. The voluntary adoption of Basel-I framework by several 
countries made it, de facto, a globally accepted standard. Although not all countries are 
still fully compliant with all the aspects of Basel-I, it has served the banking industry well 
since its introduction in 1988. It  has, however lagged behind the financial market 
developments and innovation. With time it increasingly became apparent that it offered a 
regulatory approach to capital determination and standard setting which did not capture 
fully the ever increasing range of large and complex banking operations and the 
accompanying range of diverse set of economic risks. Along with these apparant 
developments, there were quite a few sabtle developments. Academics like McKenzie 
and Khalidi (1996) questioned the very basis at the regulatory philosophy based on 
central engineering framework and emphasized on the need for improving the 
supervisory capacity of the home country supervisors (Pillar-II), and improving the 
transparancy to enhance the markets self regulatory system (Pillar-III). They outlined the 
multiple tensions facing the financial markets: 
 
 
· Tension between the power of regulatory authorities as embodied in mathematical formulae 
contained in regulations and the power of financial institutions that is exerted through the 
markets; 
 
· Tension between the constructive and destructive nature of financial innovation and the inability 
of regulators to keep pace with change; 
 
· Tension between universal norms contained in regulations and transient and uncertain market 
relations; 
 
· Tension between competition and safety within financial markets; 
 
· Tension between a desire for uniformity by regulators and a desire for difference by financial  
 institutions; 
 
· Tension between transparency and opaqueness in the flow of financial information. 
 
· Tension between the regulators constrained by the boundaries of the nation state and the industry 
which now has no territorial constraints. 
 
· Tension between the regulators who are extra-market and the industry which is free to innovate 
within market structures. 
 
· Ttension that inappropriate regulation may engender financial fragility. 
  
 These developments provided the thrust for the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (henceforth, the ‘Basel Committee’) to work on a comprehensive review of 
the Basel Accord (Basel I), and its replacement with a revised and comprehensive version 
of the Framework of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (commonly known as the Basel-II Accord). The new Framework addresses the 
perceived shortcomings and structural weaknesses of Basel-I. Compared to the crude risk 
weights of the Basel-I, the new Framework is fairly complex, making its understanding 
and implementation a challenge to both the regulatory and the regulated community. This 
is perhaps the reason why most of the developing countries have adopted a roadmap 
approach for the implementation of Basel-II at their own pace and in a manner as 
appropriate to their economies.  
 
 In the case of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has chalked out a roadmap 
for implementation of Basel-II under which the banks are required to adopt standardized 
approach for credit risk and basic indicators/standardized approach for operational risk 
from 1st January, 2008 and internal ratings based (IRB) approach from January1, 2010. 
SBP has embarked on a parallel run program of one and a half year for Standardized 
Approach and two years for IRB Approach starting from 1st July 2006 and 1st January 
2008 respectively. Banks / DFI, has been asked to formulate their internal plans 
specifying the approach they are willing to adopt and the time table for moving to the 
particular approach. 
 
 
 
 The requirement is that the plans should envisage the risk management setup, 
various risk assessment methodologies being used for assessment of various risk 
categories and the policy and procedures for the capital allocation. The plans are required 
to highlight the gaps for moving to Basel II implementation and the steps required to 
overcome those gaps. In other words, SBP has directed the banks / DFIs a time bound 
action plan outlining the activities required to be done, and the time of complition within 
the overall implementation timeframe so that it could closely maintain the 
implementation of Basel-II in the country. 
 
 While there is much emphasis on complying with the Basel-II framework and the 
State Bank of Pakistan in collaboration with the local banks is making all efforts to 
ensure smooth transition from Basel-I to Basel-II, it would be interesting to study the 
historical developments and circumstances which led to the formulation of Basel-I 
Accord in 1988 and its further refinements over the years leading to the release of a new 
and more comprehensive document on the subject in the shape of Basel-II Accord. This 
paper provides a review of the long-drawn efforts made by the Basel Committee in 
seeking international convergence on the issue of capital measurement and capital 
adequacy standards since the introduction of Basel-I in1988. The objective is to facilitate 
the readers in understanding and appreciating the importance and the rationale for an 
effective risk management system for banks. 
 
BASEL-I 
 
 The origins of the Basel-I accord can be connected to the failure of Bankhaus 
Herstatt in Germany and Franklin National Bank of New York which led the central bank 
governors of G-10 countries at the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) to establish the 
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices in December, 1974. The 
main purpose of the Committee was to prevent or reduce the possibility of transfer of 
cross border contagion from the failure of Internationally active banks. At that time there 
was not much of a coordination between the central banks of the developed countries the 
committee was therefore a set up primarily for the purpose of exchange of information on 
the financial condition of internationally active banks,  Over the years the Committee 
(which was renamed as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision-BCBS) became the 
core body influencing banking supervisory standards worldwide. It started with a low-key 
agreement allocating cross-border supervisory responsibilities among member authorities 
(“the Concordat”) in 1975, closely followed by the principle of home country 
consolidated supervision. 
 
 In the early 1980s, the Committee became concerned that the capital ratios of the 
main international banks were deteriorating just at the time that international risks, 
notably those vis-à-vis heavily indebted countries, were growing. It therefore, decided to 
halt the erosion of capital standards in the international banking system and to work 
towards greater convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. In fact, the US 
Congress’s insistence on tighter capital standards for US banks and its concern with 
avoiding a loss in US banks’ international competitiveness played a catalytic role in 
reaching this agreement. The result was the emergence of a broad consensus on a 
weighted approach to the measurement of risk incorporating both  
on and off Balance Sheet items. How this broad consensus was reached is another story. 
The issue of level playing field, especially in the context of higher capital adequacy 
requirements for US & UK banks compared to that required for the Japanese banks and 
its effect on the global competitiveness of US & UK banks was a major driving force 
behind the efforts towards the development of global standards for capital adequacy. In 
fact it has also been alleged that it was primarily the consensus reached between the US 
Federal Reserve Bank aned the Bank of England that was forced upon the rest of the 
members of the Basel Committee as the Global Standards. Irrespective of politics behind 
the global harmonization of capital adequacy standards, the fact is that there were 
genuine concerns regarding the possibility of systemic risk and the crossborder transfer of 
contagion. There was also the risk of regulatory arbitrage and the possibility of 
competition in regulatory laxity that could lead to and a reduction in the shock absorption 
capacity of the global financial system an increased possibility of bank failure. The need 
for a multilateral accord to remove the source of competitive inequality arising from 
differences in national capital requirements and to strength the stability of the 
international banking system had become imperative. 
 
 Following comments on a Consultative Paper (published in December, 1987), a 
capital measurement system commonly referred to as the Basel Capital Accord (or the 
1988 Accord) was approved by the G-10 members and released to banks in July, 1988. 
This system provided for the implementation of a framework with a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8 per cent by end-1992. Reaching at 
an agreement on the minimum capital standards in the shape of Basel-I was a landmark 
achievement of the Committee. This framework has been progressively introduced not 
only in member countries but also in virtually all other countries with active international 
banks.  
 
POST BASEL-I DEVELOPMENTS 
 
CRITICISM OF BASEL-I 
 
 The original 1988 Basel Capital Accord emerged from the string of sovereign 
debt defaults and was a reaction to growing competitive pressure to create a more level 
playing field among internationally competitive banks, where small  differences in 
pricing could have significant competitive impacts. There were quite a few problematical 
features in the original Basel Accord, for example, banks of non-OECD countries were 
assigned a higher risk weight than their OECD counter parts. The accord was therefore 
criticized for its adverse impact on developing countries’ financial systems and 
distortions in the international banking industry. The critics, however, did not recognize 
the fact that the 1988 capital framework was not intended to be static but was to evolve 
over time. This was proved when in November, 1991, the Basel-I was amended to give 
greater precision to the definition of those general provisions or general loan-loss 
reserves which could be included in capital for the purpose of calculating capital 
adequacy. Furthermore, in April, 1995 the Committee issued another amendment to the 
Capital Accord to recognize the effects of bilateral netting of banks’ credit exposures in 
derivative products and to expand the matrix of add-on factors. In April, 1996 yet another 
document was issued explaining how Committee members intended to recognize the 
effects of    
multilateral netting. The Committee also started work to refine the framework to address 
risks other than credit risk, which was the focus of the 1988 Accord. 
 
 Following two consultative processes, the Market Risk Amendment to the Capital 
Accord was released in January, 1996 to be made effective latest by end-1997. It was 
designed to incorporate within the Accord a capital requirement for the market risks 
arising from banks’ open positions in foreign exchange, traded debt securities, equities, 
commodities and options. An important aspect of this amendment was that, as an 
alternative to a standardized measurement method, banks were permitted, subject to strict 
quantitative and qualitative standards, to use internal value-at-risk (VAR) models as a 
basis for measuring their market risk capital requirements. 
 
 Following the Mexican debt crisis of 1995 and the contagion it caused, the 
Committee succeeded in finalizing yet another landmark document in 1997 viz., “Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The Core Principles were designed as a 
model for banking systems in emerging market countries and the same were later adopted 
by supervisors across the world. The third major achievement was the revision of 
minimum capital standards in 2004, known as Basel-II. This was in part motivated by the 
need to adapt the previous standards to advances in risk management techniques, which 
had encouraged regulatory arbitrage. 
 
BASEL-II 
 
 Basel-II Accord incorporates three major elements or pillars viz.,(a) minimum 
capital requirements, based on weights more closely aligned to economic risks than the 
1988 Accord; (b) supervisory review, which sets basic standards for bank supervision to 
minimize regulatory arbitrage; and (c) market discipline, which envisages greater levels 
of disclosure and standards of transparency for the banking system (Nachane et.al, 2006). 
Highlights of Basel-II are given in the Annexure. 
 
 Briefly, in Basel II regulatory capital requirements for credit risk are calculated 
according to two alternative approaches, the Standardized and the Internal Ratings-Based 
(IRB). Under the Standardized approach the measurement of credit risk is based on 
external credit assessments provided by external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) 
such as credit rating agencies or export credit agencies. Under the simplified 
Standardized approach the Basel-II Framework assembles in one place the simplest 
options of the Standardized approach with the objective of simplifying choices for certain 
banks and supervisors for measures of the other determinants. Under the advanced 
version of the IRB approach banks provide their own measures of all the determinants 
such as Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure At Default (EAD).  
 
 For regulatory capital requirements for operational risk there are three options of 
progressively greater sophistication. Under the Basic Indicator approach the capital 
charge is a percentage of bank’s gross income. Under the Standardized approach, the 
capital charge is the sum of percentages of bank’s gross income from eight business lines 
(or alternatively for two of the business lines of percentages of loans and advances). 
Under the Advanced Measurement approach, subject to the satisfaction by the bank of 
more stringent supervisory criteria, the capital is estimated by its own internal system for 
measuring operational risk (Cornford, 2005).  
 
PRE-BASEL-II CONSULTATIONS 
 
 The finalization of Basel-II has been the result of the Basel Committee’s 
sustained efforts spread over a number of years. It has been working tirelessly to get 
agreement on a New Capital Accord to replace the original agreed on by G10 bank 
supervisors back in July 1988. The quest has been driven by recognition that the original 
has become superseded by market developments, and that it is failing to operate in the 
intended fashion because of ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’.  
 
 The first visible fruits of its labor appeared in June 1999 in the form of a 
Consultative Paper (CP-1) which outlined proposals for reform of Basel I. Following 
consultation with interested parties, a revised set of reform proposals (CP2) was then 
issued in January 2001 and, once again, these were put forward for consultation. This 
duly resulted in a third Consultation Paper (CP3) issued in April 2003 and it is refinement 
of this document which resulted in the publication of Basel II in June 2004 (Hall, 2004). 
 
CONSULTATIVE PAPER 1 OF 1999 (CPI) 
 
 Since 1st January, 1993 internationally active banks incorporated in G10 countries 
have been obliged to comply with a minimum risk asset ratio requirement of 8 percent or 
higher, if so demanded by their national supervisory authority. Since 1st . January, 1998, 
however, in an attempt to accommodate banks’ market risk exposures, this methodology 
has been modified to take account of both a new source (Tier 3) of regulatory capital, 
which is available to meet market risk capital charges subject to limits and restrictions, 
and the market risks to which banks are exposed. The 8 per cent minimum ratio, 
however, remained as the effective regulatory floor. In an attempt to catch up with market 
developments since 1988, the Committee produced a set of reform proposals in June 
1999. Its specific aims were to improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect 
underlying risks, to better address the financial innovation that had occurred in recent 
years and to recognize and promote improvements in bank risk management and controls. 
The Committee was also keen to adopt a more comprehensive approach for addressing 
additional risks such as operational risk. 
 
 
 
 Under the new framework, three mutually reinforcing supervisory ‘pillars’ were 
proposed to be used, with a ‘supervisory review’ of an institution’s capital adequacy and 
internal assessment process and greater market ‘discipline’ to be effected through 
enhanced information disclosure. This was intended to operate alongside the traditional 
minimum regulatory capital requirements. The specific aims and objectives of the review 
were identified as : 
 
 To continue to promote safety and soundness in the financial system. 
 
 To continue to enhance competitive equality; 
 
 To adopt a more comprehensive approach for addressing risks; 
 
 To continue to focus on internationally active banks, although the new framework’s 
underlying principles should be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of 
complexity and sophistication.; 
 
 To improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks ; 
 
 To better address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years; 
 
 To recognize the improvements in risk measurement and control that have occurred; 
and 
 
 To introduce a framework that is flexible, more accurately reflects the risks to which 
banks are exposed, and is responsive to financial innovation and developments in risk 
management practices. 
 
 The Committee proposed to continue to use a ‘standardized’ approach based upon 
the current Accord, but amended to allow for: 
 
     The introduction of a new risk weighting scheme to address asset ssecuritization. 
 
 The application of a 20 per cent credit conversion factor for certain types of short-term 
commitments; 
 
 Abolition of the 50 per cent cap on the risk weighting of certain derivative exposures; 
 
 Wider supervisory recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques; 
 
 Extension of the accord to cover interest rate risk in the banking book and ‘other’ risk, 
such as operational risk; and 
 
 Extension of the principle of full consolidation to embrace holding company 
parents of banking groups;  Under the proposed scheme it was resolved that early 
supervisory intervention would be encouraged. Supervisors will be required to set bank-
specific capital charges that reflect each bank’s particular risk profile and control 
environment ( which may exceed the minimum capital ratio standard ) while supervisory 
review will cover, inter-alia, bank’s internal capital assessment processes and control 
environments. Also, it was intended to achieve greater market discipline by improving 
the market’s self regulatory mechanism through enhanced information disclosure 
covering the capital structure, including information on (i) amounts of Tier 1, Tier 2, and 
(if applicable) Tier 3 capital held; (ii) accounting policies, especially policies adopted in 
respect of the valuation of assets and liabilities, provisioning, and income recognition; 
(iii) components of capital and the terms and main features of capital instruments, 
especially in the case of innovative, complex and hybrid capital instruments; (iv) reserves 
set aside for credit losses and other potential losses; and (v) any conditions that may merit 
special attention in an analysis of the strength of a bank’s capital, including maturity, 
level of seniority, step-up provisions, interest or dividend deferrals, use of Special 
Purpose Vehicles, and terms of derivatives embedded in hybrid capital instruments. 
Further, with respect to risk exposures both the qualitative (e.g. management strategies) 
and quantitative (e.g. position data) information was required to be disclosed in a manner 
which facilitates objective assessment of the nature and magnitude of the risk exposures 
run by banks. Moreover, capital adequacy, including disclosure of risk-based capital 
ratios were to be calculated in accordance with the prescribed methodology, and 
qualitative disclosures about the internal processes used for evaluating capital adequacy. 
 
CONSULTATIVE PAPER 2 OF 2001 (CP2) 
 
 In the light of the feedback received during the round of consultation following 
publication of its June 1999 paper (CP1) and to accommodate developmental work 
undertaken since that date, the Committee issued a revised set of proposals (CP2) in 
January 2001. The three-pillared approach was confirmed although proposals on each 
front were refined and extended. In connection with Pillar 1, a more risk-sensitive 
framework was proposed for the ‘standardized approach. However, the use of external 
credit assessments and  the use of published country risk scores of export credit agencies 
for sovereign exposures were proposed to continue. For more complex banks, an ‘internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach’ was allowed at national discretion, subject to strict 
compliance with rigorous supervisory standards. Qualifying banks had the option to 
choose between a ‘foundation’ IRB approach and an ‘advanced’ IRB approach, 
depending on their ability to comply with demanding sets of supervisory standards. An 
explicit capital charge to cover operational risk was promised, and a new treatment 
recognizing credit risk mitigation techniques was also proposed.  
 
 In general, the changes proposed in January 2001 reflected the Committee’s 
change in regulatory philosophy from prescription and a ‘one size fits all’ policy towards 
a more flexiable approach allowing banks and their supervisors with a range of options 
for the assessment of capital adequacy. Willingness to allow banks to deploy their own 
assessments of the risks to which they are exposed in the calculation of minimum 
regulatory capital charges through the use of the IRB approaches. The CP2 also intended 
to extend the scope of the revised accord  
on a consolidated basis to parent holding companies of banking groups, as well as, on a 
sub-consolidated (stand alone) basis to all internationally active banks. The CP2 also 
confirmed that the new approach would be based on the three mutually reinforcing  
pillars previously outlined, namely, minimum regulatory capital adequacy requirements, 
supervisory review (of an institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process), 
and greater market discipline to be achieved through enhanced information disclosure. 
 
 Within Pillar-1, a ‘standardized approach’, building upon the1988 Accord but 
embracing external credit assessments, was allowed for ‘less complex’ banks; an ‘internal 
ratings-based approach’ was allowed at national discretion to banks with more advanced 
risk management capabilities which satisfy rigorous supervisory standards. The use of 
portfolio credit risk models was recognized as a possible future option.  Further, an 
explicit capital charge to cover operational risk was also introduced. Moreover, it was 
proposed to provide capital reduction for various forms of credit risk mitigation 
techniques that serve to reduce risk for banks meeting minimum operational standards 
subject to the condition that banks would be required to hold capital against residual 
risks. 
 
 Under Pillar-2, a revised and extended set of procedures were proposed whereby 
supervisors were required to ensure that each bank had sound internal processes in place 
to allow it to assess the adequacy of its capital and to set targets for capital that 
commensurate with the bank’s specific risk profile and control environment. The 
requirement was that these internal processes would be subject to supervisory review and 
intervention where appropriate. The basis of the supervisory review would include, inter 
alia, their knowledge of best practice across institutions and the minimum criteria 
attached to the various approaches available for regulatory capital assessment.  
 
 Under Pillar-3, a new and extended set of disclosure requirements and 
recommendations were set out to allow market participants to assess critical information 
describing the risk profile and capital adequacy of banks. 
 
 The Committee proposed that for banks’ exposures to sovereigns (i.e. 
governments, central banks and public sector entities (PSEs) treated as such by national 
supervisors), the use of published credit scores of export credit agencies be permitted, 
alongwith the use of other external credit assessments. The definition of a ‘short term 
inter-bank loan’was revised to include only those with an original maturity of at least 
three months as against six months, as previously proposed. Also, the Committee 
dropped its previous proposal that the availability of preferential risk weights in the 
standardized approach be made conditional on adherence to the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) ‘Special Data Dissemination Standards’, the Basel Committee’s ‘Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, or ‘International Organization of 
Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ in 
view of the fact that judgments regarding compliance with such standards would in large 
part be qualitative. 
 
 In short, the proposals contained in CP2 meant that internal ratings-based (IRB) 
systems would be made  available, on a much wider basis than originally intended, to 
qualifying banks with more advanced risk management capabilities in as much as that 
banks could choose between a ‘foundation’ approach and a more complicated ‘advance’ 
approach, depending upon their ability to comply with demanding sets of supervisory 
standards. 
 
POST CP2 DEVELOPMENTS  
 
 As indicated at the time of publication of CP2, a Working Paper on Operational 
Risk was issued in September 2001, refining the definition of operational risk. Also, in 
respect of disclosure requirements, a Working Paper on Market Disclosures with the 
intention of reducing the overall burden placed on banks was published. Two more 
Working Papers were released in October 2001. The first set out a modified IRB 
approach for the treatment of specialized lending. The second, on asset securitization, 
established the eligibility conditions for the treatment of securitized assets under the IRB 
approach. 
 
CONSULTATIVE PAPER 3 OF 2002 (CP3) 
 
 The first major initiative taken in 2002, following pressure from the German 
government and other interested parties, was to reduce the required capital charges 
associated with loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This was followed, 
in October 2002, by the Committee producing another revised set of proposals (CP3) and 
launching the third and final ‘Quantitative Impact Study’ (QIS3) to assess the likely 
effects of the revised package on the minimum capital requirements of banks worldwide. 
The latest revisions involved refinements to Pillar 1 capital charges for retail exposures: 
Under the standardized approach, the risk weights for residential mortgages and other 
retail exposures were reduced to 40 per cent (from 50 per cent) and 75 percent (from 100 
percent) respectively. The target amount of capital required for the operational risk 
charge was also cut from 20 per cent of the overall requirement rising under the current 
accord to 12 per cent, or even less. A new ‘advanced’ approach (the ‘Advanced 
Measurement Approach’ – AMA) for the calculation of the operational risk capital 
charge was also introduced which allows banks greater flexibility in the choice of 
assessment methodology. Moreover, the minimum standards required of banks seeking to 
use the IRB approaches were redrafted with a view to ensure that they result in consistent 
measures of internal estimates across institutions. 
 
 The results of QIS3 were published in May 2003 which showed considerable 
variability in the impact of the latest set of proposals on individual banks and groups of 
banks. With respect to the standardized approach, all groups of participant banks 
experienced average increases in overall capital requirements compared with current 
requirements, with small banks in the EU and G10 faring the best. The driving force 
behind this result was the introduction of a new capital charge for operational risk which 
more than offset the relief experienced with respect to retail and SME portfolios. In 
respect of the foundation IRB approach, the biggest ‘winners’ were again the small banks 
in the G10 and EU which enjoyed average reductions in overall capital charges of 19 per 
cent and 20 per cent respectively. Finally, the results indicated that the best option for 
large banks in both the EU and G10 was to adopt the advanced IRB approach, which 
yielded average capital reductions of 6 percent and 2 percent respectively on current 
levels. 
 
POST-CP3 DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 The main post-CP3 changes agreed in the run-up to the publication of Basel II 
were concerned with the revised treatment of expected versus unexpected losses within 
the IRB approach, and of securitization and credit risk mitigation techniques. It also 
included further clarifications regarding the implementation of the supervisory review of 
capital under Pillar 2, and information disclosure under Pillar 3. 
 
 Under the IRB approach (the standardized approach is not affected) the allowance 
for the inclusion of general provisions within Tier 2 capital for coverage against 
unexpected losses was discontinued. The implication being that bank’s loan pricing and 
loan loss provisioning could be used only to cover the expected element of losses. 
 
 With regard to supervisory review, the allowance for flexibility for the home 
country regulator in the application of the rules was reaffirmed without reducing the 
emphasis on the need for promoting consistency in the implementation of Pillar 2 and to 
securing convergence in supervisory practice. In this respect the ‘Accord Implementation 
Group’ (AIG) was setup to work towards facilitating information exchange and to secure 
greater cooperation between national supervisory authorities. Moreover, in respect of the 
cross border implementation of Basel II, the ‘high level principle’ outlined in August 
2003 was sugested for adoption without prejudice to the operation of the ‘Basel 
Concordat’. 
 
 With respect to Pillar 3, consultation post-CP3 focused on three main issues: 
proprietary versus public information; principles versus rules; and consistency with 
emerging accounting standards. 
 
 On 11th May, 2004, the Committee announced that ‘consensus had been reached 
on all outstanding issues’. The Committee also confirmed that the text of the new 
international capital standard would be published by end-June 2004, as previously 
intended. The Committee also stated that there was a need for a further review of the 
‘calibration’ of the new framework prior to its implementation in order to ensure that the 
objective of broadly maintaining the aggregate level of required bank capital while 
providing incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches of the new 
frame-work were satisfied. 
 
 Before the release of the Basel II Framework in June 2004, the Committee gauged 
its impact based on QIS 3 data. In the meantime, however, bank’s abilities to estimate the 
parameters for the more advanced approaches of Basel II have improved significantly. 
Furthermore, certain analyses conducted by the Committee after QIS 3 had to be based 
on approximations since not all necessary data were available. Several member countries 
therefore decided to conduct national impact studies (QIS 4) or field tests based on the 
Basel II Framework during 2004 or the first half of 2005. While these exercises did not 
represent a joint effort of the Committee, and the details varied significantly across 
countries, the Committee developed templates for a workbook and accompanying 
instructions. These could be used as a basis for the development of workbooks and 
instructions tailored to the particularities of the implementation on those countries that 
conducted a national impact study or field test. 
 
 In March 2005, the Basel Committee announced its decision to review the 
calibration of the Basel II Framework in spring 2006. In order to ensure that this review 
is based on the most recent, high quality data and to evaluate the new proposals for the 
recognition of double default and trading book-related issues, the Committee undertook a 
fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5) between October and December 2005. the results 
of this study were published on 16 June 2006. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVISED FRAMEWORK 
 
 The revised framework for assessing the capital adequacy of internationally active 
banks – Basel II – was finally endorsed by the G10 bank supervisors on 26th June, 2004. 
It incorporated all the changes agreed upon during the long drawn consultation process. 
While announcing the revised framework, the Basel Committee also outlined its intention 
to monitor and review the application of the new framework with a view towards 
achieving greater consistency in application, and to revise it where necessary to 
accommodate market developments and further advances in risk management practices. 
The Basel Committee also revealed that it was  in consultation with IOSCO, reviewing 
the regulatory treatment of bank’s trading book operations. Furthermore, the Committee 
also mentioned that it was open for reexamining the definition of eligible capital, and that 
the dialogue with the banking industry would continue concerning the possible future 
recognition of portfolio credit risk models (Hall, 2004). 
 
 Initially, CP-3 set, the deadline for implementation of Basel-II as the end of 2006. 
This requirement was later replaced by allowing greater flexibility, under which banks 
could adopt a phased rollout of the IRB approach, for example, adopting the IRB across 
asset classes within the same business unit or across business units within the same 
banking unit or across business units within the same banking group, or moving from the 
foundation to the advanced version only for some inputs to risk-weighted assets. It was 
expected that this flexibility would facilitate adoption of the IRB approach by less 
sophisticated banks. Similarly, under the regulatory capital charge for operational risk, 
partial use of the Advanced Measurement Approach was allowed, i.e. adoption of the 
approach for some parts of a bank’s operations and the simpler Basic Indicator or 
Standardized Approach for the rest. In the Basel-II which was published after a half 
year’s delay in June 2004 (rather than at the end of 2003 as envisaged  earlier) there were 
further changes in the direction of allowing greater flexibility, including a relaxation of 
the timetable and more explicit acknowledgement of the problems confronting different 
national supervisors regarding the implementation of the framework. A significant 
change in this final version of the document was the change in title from ‘The Basel 
Capital Accord’ in CP2 and CP3 to ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards’ which was indicative of the fact that the Committee had realised 
the need to shift its emphasis away from the one-off act of signing up to a controversial 
international accord towards a process likely to continue in the future as well. It also 
reflected an acceptance of the fact that in many countries adoption procedures would 
require additional assessments of the impact of the revised framework and the possibility 
of further changes in light of comments from interested parties (banks) and National 
Central Banks. 
 
 As regards the time table for the implimentation of Basel II, the Committee 
conscious of the hurdles still to be cleared, allowed the extension of the transition period 
for implementation of the more advanced approaches of Basel II, until the end of 2008. 
Furthermore since the adoption of Basel II may not be the first priority of the authorities 
in many non-G10 countries, the Committee therefore also accepted the fact that timetable 
in several countries would differ from that originally envisaged in  the revised 
framework. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Effort of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aimed at addressing some 
of the long-standing weaknesses inherent in the original Capital Accord are quite 
laudable. By responding positively to some of the criticisms leveled at it during the 
various rounds of consultations and accommodating different points of views in the 
revised framework the Committee has made it a much better and a more acceptable 
document as compared to the proposed packages of CP1,CP2 and CP3. 
 
 Although some of the stake holders are still raising concerns about various 
elements of Basel-II, the process itself has proved to be a valuable experience. It has 
facilitated the cause of sound risk management within the banking industry,  which will 
benefit not only the regulators but also the banks, their customers, and the community at 
large. Bank supervisors around the world are now already being pressurized into adopting 
the ‘best practices’ which would benefit the objective of greater financial stability. It, 
however, remains to be seen as how effectively they are able to implement the revised 
framework in their respective jurisdictions. In doing so they  are well advised not to 
attempt imposing changes too quickly as it could  have implications for certain sectors of 
their economies. Thus slow and cautious implementation of Basel-II owing to the 
required shifts in banking practice may be desirable.  
 
ANNEXURE 
 
The Mutually Reinforcing Pillars 
 
 The Basel II framework has substantive breadth and depth. It prescribes different 
approaches for different sized banks and / or domestic versus internationally active banks 
and recognizes properly different buckets of assets and assigns risk weights while 
incorporating the quality of issues / assets through rating mechanism. To allow this 
flexibility Basel II is elaborate and is bedecked with three mutually reinforcing pillars: 
 
• Minimum capital requirement (MCR – Pillar I) 
• Supervisory review process (Pillar II) 
• Market Discipline (Pillar III) 
 
 All three pillars complement each other to form an overarching risk-management 
structure for the promotion of financial stability. 
 
 The Pillar 1 provides for minimum capital requirement for 3 main risks. i.e. credit 
risk, operational risk and market risk: 
 
• For credit risks, the banks have a choice to adopt a Simplified Standardized Approach 
(SSA) with a uniform risk weight of 100 percent for corporate loans or based on 
Standardized Approach (SA) which allows use of ratings of the external credit 
assessment institutions (ECAIs). Alternatively, banks can opt for Internal Rating 
Based (IRB) which involves development of internal rating systems to measure 
capital against credit risk. Banks can adopt Foundation IRB (FIRB) using their own 
data to estimate probability of default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure 
at Default (EAD). FIRB banks will depend on fixed weights approved by their 
supervisors whereas under Advanced IRB they may use their own estimates. 
 
• Operational risk captures risks associated with internal processes, systems, and 
people. Capital for this risk is prescribed by (i) Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), (ii) 
Standardized Approach and (iii) Advanced Measurement Approach. 
 
• Market risk relates to losses due to changes in prices, interest rate and equity prices. 
If opting for standardized approach capital is calculated against market risks by using 
the parameters as specified by the regulator or under internal approach banks develop 
their own systems and models to capture risk under this category. 
 
 The Pillar I of MCR is interconnected and reinforced with the two other pillars. 
 
 Pillar II or the Supervisory Review Process. Under this, financial institutions 
should have their own internal capital assessment processes to capture risks which 
remained uncovered under Pillar 1 and thus set aside capital in line with the bank’s risk 
profile and control environment. 
 
 
 The supervisory review process validates the bank’s internal assessments by 
ensuring that the whole array of risks has been taken care of. Three risks in particular 
ought to be considered under Pillar 2: risks that are not fully captured by the Pillar 1 (e.g. 
credit concentration risk); those factors not taken into account by the Pillar 1 (e.g. interest 
rate risk in the banking book, business and strategic risk); and factors external to the bank 
(e.g. business cycle effects). Besides using qualitative assessments, both banks and 
regulators, could employ forward looking stress tests to identify possible events or 
changes in the market conditions that could adversely impact the capital adequacy. 
 
 Pillar III seeks to enhance disclosure and transparency by strengthening banks’ 
financial reporting system and by encouraging market discipline and allowing the key 
stakeholders to assess key pieces of information in the scope of application, capital risk 
exposures, risk assessment processes, and capital adequacy of the institution. Pillar III 
complements and reinforces the first two pillars and infuses market pressures to bring in 
better risk management and adequate levels of capital in the banks and keep key 
stakeholders fully informed about the risk profile of banks and enables them to take 
prudent decisions while transacting business with them. 
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